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Online education is an increasingly important component of the U.S. higher education landscape. In 2014, one in three college students in degree-granting U.S. institutions took at least one course online (Allen and Seaman, 2015) . Millions of students from all over the world also have enrolled in Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) offered in partnership with major research universities such as Harvard, MIT and Stanford (Ho et al. 2014 , McPherson and Bacow 2015 , Waldrop 2014 . By 2012, more than 6 percent of all U.S. bachelor's degrees were awarded online (Deming et al. 2016) . The rapid rise of online course offerings and degrees has led to predictions that competition from MOOCs and other online course offerings will lead to "disruptive innovation" in higher education (e.g. Christensen and Eyring 2011, Cowen and Tabarrok 2014) . While there is a growing body of research examining student outcomes among those enrolling in online degree programs or courses (Deming et al. 2016 , Bettinger et al. 2014 , no prior work has estimated the impact of this change in higher education markets on brick and mortar schools.
The exuberance over MOOCs and other high-profile online offerings obscures the fact that most of the growth in online higher education has been among the least selective institutions, especially for-profit colleges (Deming, Goldin and Katz 2012) . In 2013, selective institutions accounted for only about 2 percent of enrollment in fully online programs, compared to 33 percent for the for-profit sector (Deming et al. 2015) .
1 Online for-profits spend very little per student, and are viewed less favorably by employers than non-selective brick and mortar schools of all types (Deming et al. 2016 ).
For public institutions, the allure of online education lies in its potential to cut costs in a time of declining state support and tightening budgets (Bowen et al. 2014 ). Yet cost savings from larger classes and less student-faculty contact may cause instructional quality to suffer, and high quality online courses are -at least at the time of writing -equally or even more expensive to develop and staff than in-person courses (McPherson and Bacow 2015) .
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In this paper, we ask whether online degree programs can improve educational productivity by exerting competitive pressure on traditional brick-and-mortar institutions. How might competition from online providers affect the market for higher education? In a well-functioning marketplace, the new availability of a cost-saving technology should increase efficiency, because colleges compete with each other to provide the highest quality education at the lowest price.
The market for selective colleges is increasingly geographically integrated, and these colleges compete fiercely on the quality margin (Hoxby 1997 , Hoxby 2009 , Clotfelter 1999 . In contrast, the vast majority of students in non-selective colleges attend school close to their home and in their home state. In 2013, 39.3 percent of students at selective colleges were from out-of-state, compared to just 13.8 percent of students in less selective four-year schools and only 5.6 percent in community colleges.
In principle, local education markets can still be competitive. However, there are a few reasons to suspect that many are not. First, public colleges and universities are heavily subsidized by state and local governments and face political pressure to keep tuition low. Prices at public institutions are often set below marginal cost, which drives out private competitors who are not receiving such subsidies. Second, for political and historical reasons, public institutions are often located in communities that are not populous enough to support private competitors.
As a result of the uneven geographic dispersion of postsecondary schools and the high probability that students enrolling in nonselective schools attend close to home, non-selective public institutions in less dense areas either are local monopoly providers of education or have considerable market power. Online education has the potential to disrupt these local monopolies by introducing competition from alternative providers that do not require students to leave home to attend. The impact of competition from online providers will depend on the degree of monopoly power held by incumbents, as well as on the extent to which students are willing to substitute between online and in-person programs.
We analyze the impact of increases in prevalence and market share of online institutions on student outcomes and institutional behavior at traditional brick-and-mortar schools. Studying the impact of competitive pressure from online institutions on local education markets is inherently difficult, for two reasons. First, competitive pressure is challenging to measure directly, especially since there is sparse data on online degree programs offered by traditional brick and mortar schools. Second, it is difficult to isolate the impact of competition from online institutions from other changes affecting the market for higher education, because online degree programs by their nature are available everywhere at the same time.
We address these challenges by exploiting a 2006 change in the Federal regulation of online education called the 50 percent rule. As we discuss later, this regulatory change allowed institutions to specialize in the provision of online degrees and dramatically lowered barriers to entry into online education. Deming et al. (2015) show that the median price of an online degree dropped by 34 percent between 2006 and 2013, suggesting that online degree providers were competing with each other for students. While the regulatory change was national, we argue that it should affect local education markets differently depending on their level of competitiveness prior to 2006.
We measure competitiveness using the Herfindahl index, a standard measure of market concentration. High values of the Herfindahl index indicate that postsecondary enrollment is concentrated in a small number of institutions that are likely to enjoy monopoly power. We compare changes before and after 2006 in enrollment, prices and other outcomes in markets with more or less market concentration, using a generalized differences-in-differences framework. We define education "markets" as the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) or county if a county is not in an MSA. Finally, we calculate a Herfindahl index as of the year 2000, which predates the spread of online education.
Our results generally align with theoretical predictions of how schools should react to increased competition. We find that the impact of online competition on enrollment, prices and educational resources is greater in markets where enrollment was more highly concentrated prior to 2006. A one standard deviation increase in the Herfindahl index is associated with a post-2006 enrollment decline of about 2 percent and an increase in per-student instructional expenditures of about 1.8 percent. The impacts on enrollment are largest among not-for-profit and for-profit private institutions.
We also find that online competition shifts resources towards instructional expenditures.
Overall, a 1 standard deviation increase in the Herfindahl index post-2006 increases per-student instructional expenditures by 1.8%. This effect is largest in the public sector and among 4-year schools. In the private and two-year sectors, there is no increase in per-student instructional spending, but these institutions do experience a decline in revenues per student. These declines likely are driven by enrollment decreases from increased online competition. Thus, two-year and 4 private colleges experience a relative shift towards instructional expenditures, which are held constant in the face of declining overall resources.
We examine the effect of online competition on tuition prices as well. Our tuition analysis is restricted to private schools because public school tuition is heavily subsidized and is unlikely to reflect market forces. Somewhat contrary to expectations, we find that online competition increases average tuition, particularly in the private four-year sector and that it is associated with increased tuition dispersion, especially in the private two-year sector. One possible explanation is that tuition increases are a response to revenue losses associated with enrollment reductions from online competition. Additionally, most online institutions are for-profits that charge high prices and serve students who are heavily subsidized by Federal Title IV financial aid. If students do not face the full cost of their education when making enrollment decisions, quality competition may be more salient than price competition.
A second approach we take to identifying the competitive effects of online education programs is to use the differential spread of Internet availability across states (Goolsbee, Lovenheim and Slemrod 2010) . Since online enrollment requires access to the Internet, competitive pressures from online schools should be larger in areas with more Internet access. A drawback of this approach is that we only have comprehensive Internet penetration data at the state level, which necessitates defining education markets in a more aggregated manner. 3 Thus, this is not our preferred approach but provides supporting evidence of our market concentration results using a very different source of variation.
Similar to the market concentration analysis, we employ a difference-in-difference estimator Overall, our results suggest that there may be important general equilibrium effects of online degree programs on the market for higher education. Hoxby (1997) studies how declining transportation costs and increased sharing of information and standardized testing led to geographic integration of the market for higher education over the last several decades. As she shows, those changes were most consequential for elite colleges, who increasingly compete in a national market for students. This paper fits into the broader literature on the industrial organization of higher education by studying the impact of a technological change -online education -on less-selective, mostly open access postsecondary institutions. Like Hoxby (1997) , our results suggest that the geographic integration of higher education markets may lead to efficiency gains as institutions compete with each other for students. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis to show such effects of competition for schools that do not practice selective admissions.
I. A Brief History of Online Education in the U.S.
Long before the Internet, distance education took the form of correspondence courses that delivered lessons by mail, radio and television. U.S. colleges and universities such as University These regulatory changes had a large impact on enrollments in online programs. IPEDS only began tracking online enrollment directly in 2013, but the data are collected at the campus branch level. This makes it possible to measure enrollment at individual branches of "chain"
institutions with multiple campuses, such as the University of Phoenix. We estimate online enrollment using the method outlined in Deming, Goldin and Katz (2012) , which classifies a school campus as online if it has the word "online" in its name or if no more than 33 percent of the school's students are from one U.S. state. This is a conservative measure of online enrollment because many schools offer online degree programs through their in-person branches (see Deming, Goldin and Katz (2012) for more details). Figure 1 plots estimated yearly enrollment in online degree programs using this method and shows the significant rise in these types of programs in the early-mid 2000s. The first category includes central branches of "chain" for profit institutions where online students from across the country are likely to be assigned. For example, in 2009 DeVry University operated 26 campus branches across the U.S. The Illinois branch had an enrollment of 24,624, which was more than 3 times larger than the next largest branch and about 40 percent of total enrollment in DeVry. While some of these students were enrolled in the inperson Illinois branch, most were enrolled online. In contrast, University of Phoenix has a separate online campus that enrolled more than 300,000 students -about 77 percent of total University of Phoenix enrollment -in 2009.
Other schools, such as Ashford University and Capella University, have only a single campus branch at which nearly everyone is enrolled online.
all U.S. postsecondary enrollments. This growth was modestly larger for specialized online campuses.
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II. How Might Online Degrees Affect Higher Education Markets?
Online institutions affect local education markets by increasing competitive pressure.
Students who previously had only a limited set of choices (or perhaps no choice at all) now can choose to enroll in online institutions instead. This increase in the number of options available to students means that local colleges and universities no longer have monopoly power and must compete for students. Thus, the impact of online institutions should be proportional both to the amount of prior market power of local institutions and to the substitutability between local nonselective schools and online degree programs.
We focus on the impact of increased competitive pressure from online schools on enrollment and resource allocation among traditional postsecondary institutions. While no prior work has examined this question, it relates closely to existing research on the competitive effects of K-12 school choice. A sizable body of research examines how school choice policies affect resource levels and distribution in traditional public schools (Hoxby 2000; Hoxby 2003; Jackson 2012; Cook 2016) . While these papers find that elementary and secondary schools respond to competitive pressures by changing educational inputs, the direction and magnitude of effects tends to vary. Second, institutions of higher education have broader purposes than K-12 schools. An elementary or secondary school's main objective is to increase student learning in a small set of academic subjects. Colleges and universities also aim to increase student learning, but over a wider variety of subjects. Moreover, they aim to produce knowledge in the form of research.
Higher education markets therefore are more horizontally differentiated than their K-12 counterparts. Colleges with different objectives and different student bodies are unlikely to compete with each other. This is a key reason why we focus on nonselective schools, which offer a relatively homogenous product in a standard fee-for-service model (Hoxby 2014 ).
Third, non-attendance is usually not an option in the K-12 setting. In contrast, since people are not required to attend college, market entry of online degree programs might increase total postsecondary enrollment. This could happen through a direct effect of increasing access to college but also indirectly: if competition raises the quality of education offerings, more students might be pulled into higher education.
This market design gives rise to several predictions, which we test empirically below. Our first prediction is that the impact of competition from online degree programs on enrollment will be greater in markets where enrollment is more concentrated in a small number of institutions. This is because in the absence of outside competitors, local institutions with monopoly power will generally be providing a lower quality education for the price.
Our second prediction is that online degree programs should increase price competition and reduce economic rents for schools with monopoly power. Given that prices at public institutions are only weakly market driven at best, we might expect price competition to be most important for private institutions. If institutions compete primarily over price, then the introduction of a common (online) option should lead to a decline in the variance of tuition prices across local education markets. Again, this effect should be larger for private institutions.
Finally, we might also expect competitive pressure to lead to changes in institutional resource allocation, such as increased spending on instruction and/or student support services. The predicted effects for tuition and resources are linked: schools can compete on both prices and quality, but they might not do so equally. If competition is mainly over quality, the level and variance of tuition prices actually could increase. This might occur in an environment where tuition is subsidized by financial aid, making the actual prices faced by prospective students less salient. Thus, how postsecondary schools will respond to heightened competition is determined in part by the factors over which they compete.
III. Data

III.A. Main Analysis Data
Our main source of institutional data for this study is IPEDS, which contains institution-level information on enrollment, posted tuition prices, revenues, expenditures and educational resources for all U.S. postsecondary institutions that distribute Federal Title IV financial aid (Pell grants and Stafford loans). We collected IPEDS data at the institution-year level for years 1990-2013. 5 Our analysis is mostly restricted to years 2000-2013, which provides several years in which online degree programs prevalence was low and also insulates us from biases related to many changes in how IPEDS measures core variables of interest in the 1990s. Using 2000 as our base year allows us to obtain market concentrations that are not affected by online degree programs, but that are recent enough to accurately reflect market power in later years.
It is important to distinguish selective from nonselective institutions in our context because selective schools are much more geographically integrated, which means they have considerably less market power (Hoxby 2009 (Hoxby , 2014 Table 1 shows means and standard deviations of the outcome variables we employ in this study, both overall and by institution type. The means generally conform to expectations, with four-year and private institutions having higher per-student revenues and expenditures than their public and two-year counterparts. Furthermore, public institutions are much larger and charge lower tuition than private colleges and universities. Because we focus on nonselective institutions, our sample is comprised of 8,782 schools, about 1/3 of which are public and a little over half of which are four-year.
III.B. Measuring Market Concentration
There is little reason to expect that the distribution of public institutions across metropolitan areas reflects a competitive equilibrium. While private colleges may enter markets endogenously in response to potential profit opportunities, the location of public institutions largely reflects historical and political factors. There has been almost no new entry of public colleges or universities in the U.S. over the last 25 years. Many public institutions are located in non-urban areas that would not otherwise support a market for higher education -for example, in 2013, 18 percent of non-selective public enrollment was in non-urban areas, compared to only 8 percent for private non-selective institutions.
The uneven distribution of colleges and universities across areas in the US drives heterogeneity in the competitive effects of online postsecondary programs. To measure local market power, we first define a postsecondary market as the MSA in which a school is located. If a school is not located in an MSA, we define the market as the county. This definition thus acknowledges that students have more options in cities and can easily move across counties within the city to enroll. In less urban areas, the local schooling option is typically the community college or the non-selective four-year school located in one's county.
Our measure of market concentration is the Herfindahl index of enrollment shares. The
Herfindahl index is a measure of the extent to which enrollment is spread out evenly among many postsecondary schools or whether it is concentrated in one or only a couple schools. It is preferable to raw counts of the number of different types of schools because it takes into account the size of enrollment at each local school; a small school affects local competition less than a larger school. Formally, the Herfindahl index is the sum of squared enrollment shares across schools within a market:
where is the enrollment share in institution i in market j and Nj is the total number of postsecondary institutions in market j; ∈ [0,1], with values closer to 1 indicating less competition (more concentrated enrollment).
We calculate Herfindahl indices using 2000 enrollment data for all non-selective schools in a market as well as separately by level (two-year, four-year) and control (public, private). Thus, Hj is a fixed characteristic of the market that does not change over time. Table 1 includes tabulations separately for public and private institutions as well as for twoyear and four-year schools. Public institutions and community colleges tend to be located in markets in which there is more market power. 9 Across school types, there is in general much less competition from public institutions than from private institutions. This probably reflects endogenous decisions by private institutions to enter markets based on the supply of potential students. We examine below whether there are heterogeneous effects of online competition across the different types of sector-specific market concentration. 8 The US Department of Justice considers a market to be highly concentrated when the Herfindahl index is higher than 0.26, which illustrates the high level of market power in the nonselective higher education market. Appendix Figure 1 contains Herfindahl index distributions and highlights the large amount of variation across areas in the amount of market concentration: many areas have a Herfindahl index below 0.1, while a substantial number have an index above 0.25. 9 Appendix Figure 1 shows the distribution of the nonselective Herfindahl index for public and private institutions. While the modes of the distributions are similar, there is a much larger mass of public institutions with considerable market power. 
III.C. Measuring Internet Penetration Rates
Internet penetration rates are calculated at the state-year level using the Current Population Survey (CPS). Beginning in 1989, the CPS has included questions in various forms about
Internet access and usage. These questions were asking in 1989, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2012 . We follow the approach developed in Goolsbee, Lovenheim Furthermore, they are likely to be some "pre-treatment" trends that reflect the rise of online programs prior to 2006.
The second assumption is much more difficult to test. We control for market-year level observable characteristics to account for any compositional changes across areas that may be correlated with 2000 market shares. Because we cannot perfectly test the assumptions underlying our preferred approach, we implement a second empirical strategy that uses differences in
Internet penetration rate changes across states. While this approach relies on assumptions about the exogeneity of Internet penetration rate changes, these assumptions differ substantially from those needed to justify our preferred approach. To the extent that the estimates from both methods are similar, this alternate approach provides support for our results.
We estimate difference-in-difference models that examine how the relationship between Table 2 shows estimates from equation (1) Because of the large variance in enrollment, we prefer the log estimates. However, we present both for completeness. Column 1 presents pooled results for all non-selective colleges. Columns 2 and 3 present results for public and private enrollment (including both not-for-profit and forprofit institutions), while Columns 4 and 5 split by four-year and two-year colleges respectively.
V. Results
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V.A. Enrollment
We find consistent evidence across specifications that less competitive markets experienced Table 2 .
V.B. Tuition
In Section II, we predicted that competition from online degree programs would cause price convergence across local education markets. Figure 6 presents some initial evidence on this question by plotting the enrollment-weighted coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) for tuition in public and private non-selective schools between 1990 and 2013. Figure 6 shows that variation in tuition at private non-selective institutions held steady throughout the 1990s, but started to decline in the early 2000s. In contrast, there is little change in the variance of tuition at public institutions over this period.
While time series evidence is suggestive, in Table 3 we present estimates of equation (1) with tuition as the outcome to more closely link any tuition changes with underlying market shares.
Because public tuition is not primarily determined by market competition, we focus on private institutions. Column 1 presents results for all private schools, while Columns 2 and 3 focus on private four-year and two-year institutions, respectively.
Surprisingly, we find little evidence that competition from online institutions lowers tuition in more concentrated markets. The coefficients in Column 1 are positive but are not statistically significant at even the 10% level. They suggest a small positive effect on average tuition of about 0.5 percent for a one standard deviation increase in the H-Index. There is a negative but not significant effect for private 2-year schools in column (3) that is very small in absolute value, while the results in Column 2 actually imply increases in private four-year tuition in more concentrated markets. What could explain the positive effect on private sector tuition? One explanation is that the enrollment declines in Table 2 force private colleges to charge more to cover their fixed costs. In other words, private schools might be forced to raise tuition in order to make up for the loss in resources associated with declining enrollment. Another explanation is that price competition is not particularly strong in higher education markets where enrollment is heavily subsidized by Federal Pell grant and Stafford loan dollars, and thus price is not very salient to consumers. This suggests that schools will compete over other features, such as resources. While these explanations are not mutually exclusive, we lack the ability to distinguish them in the data. Table 4 presents estimates of equation (1) However, we view it as unlikely that all of the resource changes we document are due to enrollment effects.
IV.C. Spending
As in Table 2 , we show results for all non-selective schools as well as separately for public and private institutions and for 2-year and four-year institutions. Because there is a lot of variation in expenditures, these estimates are necessarily noisier than those discussed above. But, we find evidence that expenditures per student increase more after 2006 in more concentrated markets. The impacts are largest for instructional expenditures -a 1 standard deviation increase in market share leads to an increase in instructional expenditures per student of about 1.8 percent. As shown in Table 1 , there is significant variance associated with these outcomes, so we favor the log model; we focus on these although we present both for interested readers.
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The impact on instructional expenditures is largest for 4-year schools (3.1 percent for a 1 standard deviation increase in the H-index) and for public schools (1.9 percent for a 1 standard deviation increase in the H-index). We find no statistically significant impact of market concentration on instructional spending in 2-year schools or private schools. The results for overall spending per student are consistent with those for instructional spending but are less precise. The one exception is that we see a reduction in overall spending due to increased competition among all nonselective schools, which is driven by the private sector. Panel C shows that the expenditure declines in the private sector we document are driven in large part by changes in per-student revenues. Both private and 2-year schools experience significant declines in revenues due to heightened competitive pressures.
Private schools are heavily reliant on tuition funding. Table 2 shows these institutions experience sizable declines in enrollment when there is increased competition. We also find -in Table 3 -that they increase tuition in response to online competition. However, Table 4 shows that these tuition increases do not fully offset the impact of declining enrollment on per-student revenues.
Comparing the revenue changes to the expenditure changes, one possible explanation is that while private and two-year schools are shifting resources toward instruction, they nonetheless face increasingly-binding financial constraints that reduce the total amount of resources available to them. The result is that these institutions are able to hold instructional expenditures per student relatively constant in the face of declining total resources. Despite the fact that revenues decline, there is a relative shift to instructional expenditures in the private and two-year sectors.
In contrast, there is no impact on per-student revenue in public schools and four-year schools.
This could be because state appropriations counteract reductions in tuition revenue from enrollment declines in the four-year sector (we do not see a consistent enrollment effect in the public sector). It also is the case that four-year schools tend to be less reliant on tuition revenues, which reduces their exposure to revenue losses when enrollment declines. Instructional expenditures per student rise considerably, which suggests that public schools may respond to threat from online competitors by increasing the breadth of course offerings, lowering class sizes, or increasing instructional expenses. Unfortunately, the IPEDS data do not allow us to examine more specific categories of instructional spending.
IV.D. Heterogeneity in Market Power Across Sectors
Throughout the analysis, we have characterized competition using nonselective enrollment concentrations. This aggregation may miss important heterogeneity in market power across
sectors. As Table 1 shows, private schools tend to have less market power than public schools. If schools in these sectors compete within but not across sectors, our aggregation of all enrollments will miss important aspects of how competition operates. In Table 5 , we present results from a model similar to equation (1) Panel A shows log enrollment estimates; the results load completely on the private sector Hindex. The enrollment effect on all nonselective schools is similar to the effect in Table 2 , at 1.8 percent for a one standard deviation change in the private Herfindahl index (0.29). Reassuringly, market concentration of private institutions has a larger impact on private college enrollment.
While private enrollment responds to heightened competition in both the public and private sector, the effects are in opposing directions: A one standard deviation increase in the public institution H-index leads to an increase in private college enrollment of about 1.7 percent, whereas a one standard deviation increase in private institution H-index leads to a 3.8 percent decline in enrollment. In contrast, we find no evidence that increased public or private market concentration affects enrollment at public institutions after 2006.
In the last two panels of the table, we provide expenditure and instructional expenditure estimates overall and separately for the public and private sectors. In general, we find that expenditure and instructional expenditure at both public and private institutions are more responsive to competition among public schools, although the estimates are somewhat imprecise.
Specifically, we find that per-student expenditure and instructional expenditure at private 20 institutions decline with public-school market concentration after 2006, while public per-student instructional expenditure increases with public-school market concentration. Private college market concentration does not affect public or private institutional expenditures.
V. Results from Internet Penetration Variation
Finally, in Table 6 we present results from a complementary identification strategy that exploits state-by-year variation in Internet penetration, following equation (3). This identification strategy has considerably less power than our preferred approach, so we only show estimates for all nonselective schools. Despite the reduced statistical power, these results present supporting evidence that is important given the potentially strong assumptions underlying casual identification in equation (1).
The results in Table 6 are qualitatively similar to those shown above. A 10 percentage point increase in the Internet penetration rate post-2006 leads to a 0.7% reduction in nonselective enrollment and an increase of $1,587 per student in instructional expenditures. We also find positive coefficients on overall expenditures and revenues per student. Only the instructional expenditures effect is significant at even the 10% level. While imprecise, the fact that these results are broadly consistent with our baseline estimates suggests our conclusions are not being overly affected by biases driven by differential trends or shocks correlated with 2000 market shares and with the timing of federal guidelines supporting online postsecondary options.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we study the impact of increased competition from online degree programs on traditional postsecondary institutions. Following a regulatory change that increased the market entry and enrollment of online institutions after 2006, local schools in less competitive markets experienced relative declines in enrollment. The impacts on enrollment were concentrated among less selective private institutions that are likely to be online schools' closest competitors. We also find that institutions responded to competitive pressure by increasing instructional spending, a broad proxy for quality. These impacts are driven by public institutions, suggesting that they also felt pressure to improve quality in response to online competition. In contrast, we find no 21 evidence that increased competition lowered prices for in-person degree programs, perhaps because Federal Title IV subsidies weaken price competition in higher education.
Our results show the importance of thinking broadly about the impact of online degree programs on U.S. higher education. Several recent studies have found that online courses and degree programs lead to less learning, lower degree completion rates and worse labor market outcomes. However, our findings suggest that online education can be an important driver of innovation and productivity in U.S. higher education even if (at least at the time of writing) online institutions are producing a lower quality product. Our results provide preliminary evidence that the threat of "disruption" from online education may cause traditionally sluggish and unresponsive institutions to improve quality or risk losing students. Another direct benefitunexamined in this paper -is the impact of online schools on access to higher education for students who do not live near a traditional campus or who must enroll during irregular hours.
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